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Star Creation: The Incubation of
Mutual Funds
Alan R. Palmiter
Ahmed E. Taha

62 Vand. L. Rev. 1485 (2009)

Mutual fund incubation is a process by which new funds are
initially operated out of public view. The high-performingfunds are
then marketed to investors, and the low-performing funds are
quietly terminated. This selection process is not revealed to
investors, thus creating the illusion that the successful funds'
returns were the result of skill rather than luck. Also, some fund
companies subsidize their incubator funds in ways that do not
continue after the funds are sold to the public. As a result, the high
returns of successful incubator funds generally do not persist after
the funds are marketed to investors. We argue that incubation is a
misleading practice that must be better addressed by the SEC.
Although SEC rules prevent marketing of funds based on preregistrationperformance, the SEC permits companies to engage in
post-registration incubation without disclosing to investors the
selection process or the typical lack of performance persistence. In
addition, the SEC permits funds to selectively use performance data
from predecessor and similar funds and private accounts without
disclosing the selection process. We recommend greaterdisclosure, or
outright prohibition, of fund incubation and similar deceptive
practices.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine that a stockbroker sends a mass mailing to 20,000
investors predicting the direction of ABC Corporation's stock price
over the next month. Half of the letters say the stock price will rise;
the other half say that it will fall. As luck would have it, ABC's price
rises over the next month.
The broker then sends another mass mailing to the 10,000
investors who received the first letter accurately predicting ABC's
rise. The new letter reminds them of the broker's prediction about
ABC's stock and makes a new prediction about DEF's stock for the
next month. As before, half of the letters say that DEF's stock will
rise, the other half that it will fall. Over the next three months, the
broker sends mass mailings making similarly contradictory
predictions about GHI's stock, then about JKL's stock, and finally
about MNO's stock. The next month, the broker sends a final letter to
the 625 investors who received an unbroken stream of five accurate
predictions. The letter points out how much they would have made
had they relied on the broker's predictions and offers his services-for
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a large fee. Impressed with his track record, many of the recipients
invest through the broker.'
Did the broker commit fraud under U.S. securities law?
Technically, the letters were truthful. The 625 investors in the
broker's final solicitation had actually received five consecutive
accurate predictions and could have profited from these predictions.
But the misleading nature of the broker's conduct is obvious. The
investors were never told that the broker simultaneously had made
contradictory, incorrect predictions to other investors. The broker
disclosed only his successes, not his failures, and so misled investors
into believing that he had stock-picking skill.
This Article argues that the process by which many mutual
fund companies bring new funds to market deceives investors much as
our enterprising broker did. Through a process known as "incubation,"
a fund company creates a number of start-up funds ("incubator
funds"), typically seeded with the company's or its insiders' own
money, that are allowed to operate outside of the public eye for up to
several years. During their incubation periods, these funds are not
marketed to the public, although they are registered with the SEC
because only post-registration performance data can subsequently be
reported and advertised. After incubation, the company actively
markets the strong performers by advertising their high returns to
attract investors. The weak performers are quietly terminated, their
existence hidden from the public.
Fund companies mislead investors by marketing highperforming incubator funds without mentioning the process by which
they were culled from their low-performing brethren. By highlighting
successful incubator funds and not disclosing the failure rate in the
incubation process, fund companies make it appear that the highperforming funds' managers have special stock-picking abilities-and
that the high returns are likely to continue. Studies show, however,
that after being sold to the public, these high-performing funds
generally do not continue to outperform other funds. Strong
performance during an incubation period is often simply a matter of
chance.
To make matters worse, some fund companies artificially
inflate the returns of their incubator funds. For example, they
overallocate "hot" initial public offerings-which are very likely to rise
quickly in price-to their incubator funds. In addition, they keep their
incubator funds very small and restrict shareholder redemptions
1.

For a version of this story, see DANIEL R. SOLIN, THE SMARTEST INVESTMENT BOOK

YOU'LL EVER READ 45-46 (2006).
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during their incubation periods, making it easier to generate high
fund returns. But this favorable treatment is not clearly disclosed and
does not continue after the funds are sold to the public.
Although fund incubation misleads investors, the SEC has paid
little attention to the issue. The agency has challenged only a few
extreme cases of undisclosed fund subsidization, despite evidence that
the practice is widespread. In addition, it has allowed companies to
choose to market actively only their high-performing incubator funds
without disclosing the resulting selection bias. Fund incubation
deserves much more scrutiny. Fund marketing that highlights only
incubator funds' successes without also revealing their failures is
inherently misleading.
This Article fills a vacuum in the legal literature by identifying
and addressing an important regulatory challenge. It is the first
article to examine comprehensively both how incubation misleads
investors and the SEC's insufficient response to the problem. It also
proposes a better regulatory approach to the problem of incubation.
Section I presents background information about the size and scope of
the mutual fund market, a market that provides a primary vehicle for
U.S. retirement savings. It also describes how investors flock to funds
with high past performance. Section II, drawing on studies from the
finance literature, examines how fund companies use incubation to
create and then market new funds with artificially strong
performance. Section III describes the limited and inadequate steps
the SEC has taken to regulate the misleading marketing of incubator
funds. Finally, Section IV proposes and discusses additional steps that
the SEC should take to prevent the misuse of incubator funds.
I.

THE MUTUAL FUND MARKET:
AN OVERVIEW

A. Importance of Mutual Funds
A mutual fund pools multiple investors' money into a single
investment portfolio managed by a fund management company. 2 An
investor who purchases shares of the fund is entitled to a
proportionate return from the assets held by the fund. 3 Thus, a fund
shareholder does not own the fund's assets directly but, rather, owns a

2.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds,
(July 2, 2008), http://sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm.
3.
Id.
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piece of the mutual fund. 4 Funds vary considerably in the types of
financial assets they hold, their investment objectives and strategies,
and their fees and expenses. 5 The SEC is the primary regulator of the
mutual fund industry, but no government agency guarantees or
6
insures shareholders' fund investments.
As of the end of 2008, U.S. mutual funds held $9.6 trillion in
7
assets, including 24 percent of all outstanding equity of U.S. public
companies. 8 Investors have a great number of funds to choose from8,889 as of the end of 2008. 9 Although no single fund family dominates
the mutual fund market, the five largest fund families control 38
percent of the industry's total assets. 10 Some fund families, such as
Fidelity Investments and the Vanguard Group, offer more than one
hundred funds.11
Ownership of mutual funds is widespread. Of the 116 million
households in the United States, almost 52.5 million (or 45 percent)
own mutual funds, far more than hold individual securities, such as
stocks and bonds. 12 In addition, most households that own mutual
funds have moderate income and wealth. The median household
income of mutual fund investors is $80,000.13 Sixty-three percent of
households that own mutual funds have incomes of less than
$100,000, and 22 percent have incomes below $50,000.14 Fund-owning
households have median total financial assets of only $200,000 and a
15
median of $100,000 invested in mutual funds.
Mutual fund ownership is so widespread largely because
mutual funds have become a primary way that Americans save for

4.
5.
6.

Id.
Id.
Id.

7.

INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 9 fig. 1.1

(49th ed. 2009), available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2009_factbook.pdf [hereinafter 2009
FACT BOOK].

8.
Id. at 11 fig.1.4.
9.
Id. at 15 fig.1.9.
10. Id. at 21 fig.2.2.
11. Vanguard Mutual Funds, https://personal.vanguard.com/us/FundsStocksOverview?
Entry=Homeoffer01 (last visited Sept. 12, 2009) (listing current Vanguard funds); All Fidelity
Funds Daily Pricing, http://personal.fidelity.com/productsfunds/framesets/daily-prices-frame.
shtml?refpr=zffdfp03 (last visited Sept. 12, 2009) (listing current Fidelity funds).
12. Investment Company Institute, Ownership of Mutual Funds, Shareholder Sentiment,
and Use of the Internet, RESEARCH FUNDAMENTALS,
at 3 fig.1 (2008), available at
www.ici.org/pdf/fm-v17n6.pdf [hereinafter ICI, Ownership Trends].
13.

INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, PROFILE OF MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDERS 6 fig.1.3

(2009), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rptprofileO8.pdf.
14. Id.
15. 2009 FACT BOOK, supra note 7, at 73 fig.6.2.
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retirement. Mainly as a result of the rapid growth of mutual fund
investments in defined-contribution retirement plans and Individual
Retirement Accounts, mutual funds' total share of retirement assets
grew from 5 percent at the end of 1990 to 24 percent in September
2008.16 Mutual funds now constitute almost a quarter of retirement
savings in the United States.
Consistent with the long-term investment horizon of many
fund investors, 38 percent of mutual fund holdings are in equity funds,
with most of the rest in money market funds (39 percent) and bond
funds (18 percent). 17 Equities tend to have higher returns in the long
run, but greater risk in the short run, than do bonds and money
18
market securities.
In summary, our nation relies upon mutual funds. Mutual
funds constitute a significant portion of our savings and are a
particularly important component of our retirement system. Thus, it is
essential that investors not be misled when choosing among mutual
funds.
B. Performance-Chasingby Fund Investors
Because of their importance, mutual funds have attracted
much attention from scholars. An extensive body of research examines
how investors choose among the vast number of available funds.
These studies paint an unflattering portrait of the typical
mutual fund investor. This research finds that fund investors in
general are uninformed and lack financial sophistication. For
example, most fund investors are unaware of the investment
objectives, composition, and risks of their funds. In addition, most
investors are ignorant of the level of fees and expenses charged by
their funds; as a result, these costs are often not an important factor
19
in their fund choices.
Although investors pay little attention to a fund's objectives,
risk, and costs, they pay great attention to a fund's historical returns.

16. Investment Company Institute, The U.S. Retirement Market, Third Quarter 2008,
RESEARCH FUNDAMENTALS, at 11-13 figs.A1-A3 (2009), www.ici.org/pdf/retmrkt-update.pdf
[hereinafter ICI, Retirement Market]. In addition to being in defined contribution plans and
Individual Retirement Accounts, retirement assets are in annuities, government pension plans,
and private defined benefit plans (i.e., traditional private pension plans). Id. at 2 fig.1.
17. Investment Company Institute, Trends in Mutual Fund Investing (Apr. 2009),
http://www.ici.org/highlights/trends-04-09.
18. JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN 12-18, 24-27 (4th ed. 2008).
19. For a survey of these studies, see Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund
Investors:Divergent Profiles,2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 934, 974-94 (2008).
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Studies have found that this may be the most important factor to the
typical fund investor.
1. Investors Chase Past Returns
Surveys uniformly identify the importance of a fund's past
returns to investors. Capon, Fitzsimons, and Rice conducted a
telephone survey of almost 3,400 households that invest in mutual
funds. 20 They found that a fund's "investment performance track
record" is the most important factor in investors' choice of funds. 21
Also, a survey sponsored by the Investment Company Institute-the
mutual fund industry's trade association-of 737 mutual fund
investors found that 69 percent reviewed a fund's "historical
22
performance" before investing.
Experiments involving investors have similar findings. An
experiment by Wilcox asked fund investors to choose among
hypothetical stock mutual funds that differed in up to six
characteristics: (1) the fund company's name, (2) the fund's load, (3)
the fund's annual management fee, (4) the fund's return during
previous year, (5) the fund's average annual return during the
previous ten years, and (6) the fund's beta. 23 The experiment found
that a fund's returns over the past ten years and over the previous
24
year were the two most important factors to investors.
Studies of investors' actual behavior confirm that investors
flock to mutual funds with the highest past returns. For example, Del
Guercio and Tkac examined fund flow-the aggregate amount that
investors put into or withdraw from a particular fund during a
particular period-for a large sample of equity mutual funds. 25 They
26
found that a fund's past returns have a strong positive effect on flow.
In addition, this positive relationship was strongest for funds with the
highest past returns, indicating that investors especially chase the
20. Noel Capon, Gavan J. Fitzsimons & Russ Alan Prince, An Individual Level Analysis of
the Mutual Fund Investment Decision, 10 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 59 (1996).
21. Id. at 66.
22. INVESTMENT COMPANY
MUTUAL
FUND INFORMATION

INSTITUTE, UNDERSTANDING INVESTOR PREFERENCES FOR
3 fig. 1
(2006),
http://ici.org/pdf/rpt_06_inv-prefs-full.pdf

[hereinafter ICI, INVESTOR PREFERENCES].
23. Ronald T. Wilcox, Bargain Hunting or Star Gazing? Investors' Preferences for Stock
Mutual Funds, 76 J. BUS. 645 (2003). Beta is a measure of a fund's risk.
24. Id. at 650.
25. Diane Del Guercio & Paula A. Tkac, The Determinants of the Flow of Funds of Managed
Portfolios: Mutual Funds vs. Pension Funds, 37 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 523, 533
(2002).
26. Id. at 525. The authors used the fund's excess return (the extent to which it outperforms
the S&P 500) as the measure of the fund's return. Id. at 539.
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highest-performing funds. 27 Similarly, Sirri and Tufano's study of flow
into equity mutual funds found that higher returns led to more flow
for a fund. This was especially true for the highest-performing quintile
of funds, again showing that investors seek funds with the strongest
28
past performance.
2. Past Returns Are Poor Predictors of Future Returns
Although investors chase funds that have produced the highest
historical returns, there is little reason for them to do so. The finance
literature finds only "weak and controversial evidence that past
29
performance has much, if any, predictive ability for future returns."
In other words, little evidence of returns persistence exists; top
performing funds generally do not continue to outperform other funds
30
by any significant margin.
Furthermore, even to the extent that some persistence exists,
such persistence may not be meaningful to investors picking among
mutual funds because of the transaction costs, such as loads and
capital gains taxes, that would be incurred in chasing recent high
performers. 31 In a survey of studies on returns persistence,
Cuthbertson, Nitzsche, and O'Sullivan found some evidence of small
performance persistence by the highest performing funds, but
concluded that "it seems likely that such costs [e.g., loads, rebalancing

27. Id. at 525.
28. Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589,
1599 (1998); see also Travis Sapp & Ashish Tiwari, Does Stock Return Momentum Explain the
"Smart Money" Effect?, 59 J. FIN. 2605, 2607 (2004) (finding that fund flows into U.S. equity
mutual funds "effectively demonstrate[] that fund investors appear to be chasing recent large
returns ").

29. Wilcox, supranote 23, at 651.
30. Jonathan B. Berk & Richard C. Green, Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in
Rational Markets, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1269, 1270 & n.1 (2004) ("The relative performance of
mutual fund managers appears to be largely unpredictable using past relative performance....
While some controversial evidence of persistence [of mutual fund returns] does exist . . . it is
concentrated in low-liquidity sectors or at shorter horizons.").
31. Nicolas P.B. Bollen & Jeffrey A. Busse, Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund
Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569, 587-88 (2004). Many mutual funds charge front-end or
back-end (deferred) loads that investors must pay when they buy or sell fund shares,
respectively. Also, to discourage short-term trading, many mutual funds impose fees on investors
who sell shares soon after buying them. In addition, when an investor sells mutual fund shares
for a gain, the investor must pay capital gains taxes. Investors who sell fund shares less than one
year after buying them pay a higher capital gains tax rate than do investors who hold the shares
for more than one year.
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costs and taxes] would outweigh" the extra returns that investors
32
could gain by chasing this performance persistence.
Even in situations in which past performance will definitely
not be predictive of future returns, investors still irrationally chase
past returns. In an experiment involving Wharton MBA and Harvard
College students-a group likely more sophisticated than typical fund
investors-Choi, Laibson, and Madrian asked participants to allocate
an investment among four S&P 500 index funds with different
expense ratios. 33 Participants would maximize their expected
compensation for participating in the experiment by choosing the fund
with the highest future return, which for index funds is the fund with
the lowest expense ratio. 34 In the experiment, however, the higherexpense funds had higher reported past annualized returns, but only
35
because they had different inception dates from the other funds.
Participants nonetheless chose the index funds that had the higher
past returns, even though these higher-expense funds would
36
necessarily underperform the lower-expense funds in the future.
In summary, in choosing a mutual fund, investors place far too
much emphasis on high past performance, a factor with little
predictive ability. 3 7 The tendency of investors to chase high past
returns, however, has important implications for mutual fund
companies because management fees are based on the amount
invested in the fund.
3. Fund Companies Advertise Strong Past Performance
Because investors chase past returns, it is unsurprising that
mutual fund companies often advertise strong past performance.
Huhmann and Bhattacharyya found that almost 42 percent of mutual
fund advertisements in Barron's and Money magazine over a two-year
period mentioned a fund's high or increasing returns, and an

32. Keith Cuthbertson, Dirk Nitzsche & Niall O'Sullivan, Mutual Fund Performance 69
(Dec. 12, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=955807).
33. James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, Why Does the Law of One Price
Fail? An Experiment on Index Mutual Funds 7-8 (Mar. 6, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/jjc83/fees.pdf. Participants also included Harvard
staff members and a small number of Wharton undergraduate students and Wharton Ph.D.
students. Id. at 14.
34. Id. at 4,21.
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id.
37. To the extent that an investor is focusing on past returns, the investor is focusing less on
more important factors, such as the fund's costs, and whether the fund's objective and
investment strategy are consistent with the investor's objectives and risk tolerance.
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additional 26 percent of the advertisements explicitly discussed a
38
fund's risk-adjusted returns.
Similarly, Mullainathan and Shleifer examined mutual fund
advertisements that appeared in Money and BusinessWeek over a
nine-year period and a ten-year period, respectively. 39 They found that
funds' past returns were mentioned in 62 percent of equity mutual
fund advertisements appearing in Money, and in 59 percent of equity
mutual fund advertisements appearing in BusinessWeek. 40 Moreover,
they found a high correlation (greater than 0.7) between the
returns
percentage of equity fund advertisements that mentioned past
41
general.
in
market
stock
the
of
performance
and the recent
In addition, Swensen examined the extent of mutual fund
advertising from 1997 to 2003 in the first quarter of the Wall Street
Journal's Mutual Funds Quarterly Review, a quarterly mutual fund
supplement to the Wall Street Journal.42 He found that the space
dedicated to mutual fund advertisements was highly positively
correlated to stock prices. For example, during the bull market from
1998 to 2000, mutual fund advertisements constituted between 40 to
44 percent of the nearly fifty page Review. Then, as the bull market
ended, fund advertising was significantly reduced, reaching only 16
percent of the thirty-four page Review in 2003. In addition,
performance advertisements-those that present a fund's past
returns-plunged from 61 percent and 56 percent of all fund
advertisements in the high-performance years of 1999 and 2000, to
only 28 percent and 26 percent in the low-performance years of 2001
and 2002. 43 Thus, total pages of performance advertisements dropped
by approximately 83 percent from 12.1 pages in 1999 to 2.0 pages in
2003.44
38. Bruce A. Huhmann & Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya, Does Mutual Fund Advertising
Provide Necessary Investment Information?, 23 INT'L J. BANK MARKETING 296, 303 tbl.I (2005).
39. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, Persuasion in Finance 9-10 (Dec. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=864686).
40. Id. at fig.5. These averages were calculated by counting the percentage of equity fund
advertisements each quarter that mentioned the fund's returns, and then averaging these
quarterly measures.
41. In particular, they found that the correlation of one quarter lagged S&P 500 returns
with the percentage of equity fund advertisements that mention past returns was 0.71 for Money
and 0.74 for BusinessWeek. Id.
42.

DAVID F.

SWENSEN,

UNCONVENTIONAL

SUCCESS:

A FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH TO

PERSONAL INVESTMENT 167-69 & tbl.5.4 (2005).
43. Id. at 168 tbl.5.4.
44. Id. In 1998, the Review had forty-eight total pages, 44 percent of the space was mutual
fund advertisements, and 44 percent of these advertisements were performance advertisements,
so there were a total of 12.1 performance advertisement pages (48 pages x .44 x .44 = 12.1). In
2003, the Review had thirty-four total pages, 16 percent of the space was mutual fund
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Mutual fund companies are especially likely to advertise
particular funds that have performed well. Jain and Wu examined
fund flows into 294 equity mutual funds that advertised in Barron's or
Money magazine. They found that advertised funds outperformed nonadvertised funds with the same investment objective by an average of
approximately 6 percent over the twelve months prior to the
advertisements. 45 The advertised funds also outperformed other
benchmarks, such as the S&P 500 index, although by less. 46 Similarly,
Koehler and Mercer examined equity mutual fund performance
advertisements that appeared in BusinessWeek and Fortune
magazines over a four-year period. 47 They found that mutual fund
companies tended to advertise their funds that had performed the
48
best.
Fund advertising works. In Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince's
survey, fund investors stated that advertising was their second most
important source of information about funds. 49 Also, Jain and Wu
found that advertised funds experience approximately 20 percent
greater flow than do similar funds that do not advertise. 50 In addition,
they found that funds that are advertised more often receive even
51
more flow.
Similarly, Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks examined the effect of
advertising on flows into approximately one hundred fund families.
They found that the effect of advertising on flows into fund families is
convex: "High relative levels of advertising are significantly related to
high fund flows at the family level, while variations of relative levels
of advertising within the low advertising group do not have a
advertisements, and 36 percent of these advertisements were performance advertisements, so
there were a total of 2.0 performance advertisement pages (34 pages x .16 x .36 = 2.0).
45. Prem C. Jain & Joanna Shuang Wu, Truth in Mutual Fund Advertising: Evidence on
Future Performance and Fund Flows, 55 J. FIN. 937, 943 (2000). But see Steven Gallaher, Ron
Kaniel & Laura Starks, Madison Avenue Meets Wall Street: Mutual Fund Families, Competition
and Advertising 29, 44 tbl.8 (Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=879775) (finding a relationship between the past returns of fund
families and the amount of advertising only for small, low-performing fund families).
46. Jain & Wu, supra note 45, at 943-46 & tbl.II.
47. Jonathan J. Koehler & Molly Mercer, Selection Neglect in Mutual Fund Advertisements,
55 MGMT. SCIENCE 1107 (2009).

48. In particular, the advertised funds' median one-year, five-year, and ten-year
performance was at the 80th, 100th, and 100th percentile, respectively, of all company-operated
equity funds that shared the same investment objective. The advertised funds also had a median
one-year, five-year, and ten-year performance at the 79th, 88th, and 88th percentile,
respectively, of all company-operated equity funds, irrespective of the investment objective. Id. at
9.
49. Capon et al.,
supra note 20, at 66 tbl.1.
50. Jain & Wu, supra note 45, at 957 (2000).
51. Id.
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significant impact on flows to the family." 52 In other words, fund
investors respond to heavy advertising.
In summary, by advertising funds that have performed well,
mutual fund companies encourage and exploit investors' tendency to
chase strong past performance. Advertising of high past returns
attracts investment, thus increasing the management fees that
investors pay these fund companies, even though these high returns
generally do not persist.
II. INCUBATION OF MUTUAL FUNDS
Given the importance that investors place on past performance,
fund sponsors have a great incentive to create and market funds with
a record of strong returns. Through fund incubation-the process of
creating funds outside of the public eye and then selling only the
strong performers to the public-companies can generate new funds
with misleadingly high returns. In addition, incubator funds are often
subsidized to create even more impressive, albeit deceptive,
performance records. This section describes the incubation process
and its prevalence, the superior performance of incubator funds before
they are sold to the public relative to how they perform after, and the
reasons for this performance differential.

A. Process and Prevalence of Fund Incubation
In general, mutual fund incubation involves the creation by a
fund company of an investment fund, typically with a small amount of
seed money supplied by the company or its insiders. After a period of
several months to several years, the fund company decides-largely
based on the fund's performance-whether to terminate the fund or
actively market it to the public. Before a fund can be sold publicly, it
must be registered with the SEC. Sometimes fund companies wait to
register a fund until they decide to open the fund to the public; this
waiting period is called "private incubation." 53 Sometimes fund
companies initially register the fund but do not actively market it
until they see how it performs; this practice is called "public
incubation." 54 This Article refers generally to both approaches as
"incubation."

52. Gallaher et al., supra note 45, at 31.
53. Richard B. Evans, Mutual Fund Incubation 7-8 (Mar. 21, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript, availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=lO05167).
54. Id. at 7.
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Fund incubation, which publicizes high-performance successes
and hides low-performance
failures, is necessarily opaque.
Determining the prevalence of incubation is difficult because fund
sponsors do not disclose that high-performing new funds were culled
from low performers and actually try to hide the low-performing funds
from public view.
Nonetheless, evidence exists indicating that fund incubation is
common. Fund companies often terminate the registration of a fund
before it is offered to the public or delay in offering a registered fund
to the public. The most plausible explanation for such behavior is that
the fund company was waiting to see whether the fund's performance
would be strong enough to market it to the public. Thus, these cases
provide strong evidence of incubation.
1. Deregistration of Fund before Going Public
Indicates Incubation
One indicator of incubation is the deregistration of a fund
before its shares are sold to the public. When a registered fund is
terminated, the fund sponsor may file an application for deregistration
with the SEC under Section 8(f) of the Investment Company Act of
1940.55 Deregistration of a fund before it was offered to the public
indicates disappointing pre-public performance. Such deregistrations
are not rare. For example, Wisen and Chiang found that at least fortynine funds applied for deregistration from July 1997 to July 2000
before going public. 56 Counting only such deregistered funds, however,
greatly understates the prevalence of incubation. Deregistration
notices only reveal those unsuccessful, registered incubator funds that
fund companies decided to not take public. They do not include
registered incubator funds that continue to operate but have not yet
been taken public. Nor do they include successful incubator funds that
have been taken public and are still in operation.
2. Long Lag between Inception and Obtaining a Ticker Symbol
Indicates Incubation
Another indicator of fund incubation is a long lag between the
fund's inception and when the fund sponsor obtains a ticker symbol for
the fund. Fund sponsors can effectively avoid making even registered
55. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(f) (2008).
56. They found these applications for deregistration in the Dow Jones News Archive. Craig
Wisen & Kevin C.H. Chiang, Explaining the Initial Returns of Mutual Funds, 15 J. INVESTING
53, 54 (2006).
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funds available to the public by not seeking a ticker symbol for the
fund. Although a fund may legally be sold to the public after it is
registered, as a practical matter, the public cannot buy the fund until
it receives a ticker symbol.
The practice of delay in obtaining a ticker symbol appears to be
widespread. For example, looking at over one thousand domestic
equity mutual funds that began operations on or after January 1996
and received a ticker symbol by January 2006,5 7 Evans found that 23
percent of these funds had more than twelve-month lags between their
inception date and when they received a ticker symbol, and 10 percent
58
had a lag of at least twenty-five months.
The effect of withholding a ticker symbol is dramatic. Evans
examined funds with more than a twelve-month lag between their
inception date and when they received a ticker symbol, comparing
their size before and after they obtained a ticker symbol. He found
that the median size of such funds during their incubation period (or
pre-ticker symbol) was only $6.8 million; the median size after
incubation (or post-ticker symbol) was $30.0 million-more than four
59
times as large.
3. Long Lag between Inception and Reporting to Data Providers
Indicates Incubation
Registered funds can also be kept from public view by not
reporting their existence to mutual fund data providers such as
Morningstar. 60 Data providers rely upon fund sponsors to notify them
of the creation of a new fund. Thus, another indicator of incubation is
a long delay between when the fund began operations and when
information about the fund appears in a data provider's database.
When a fund first appears in Morningstar, its returns since its
inception date are included. Therefore, the length of these "back
returns" is a measure of how long the fund sponsor waited to report
the fund to Morningstar. Lengthy delays in reporting a fund appear to
be common. Ackermann and Loughran examined ninety-five domestic
equity mutual funds that entered Morningstar's fund database from

57. Domestic equity funds have as their objective to invest primarily in the stock of
American companies. Evans, supra note 53, at 14-15.
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id. at 16. The mean fund size showed similar growth, from $38.8 million during the
incubation period to $146.6 million after incubation. Id.
60. Id. at 10.
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2000 to 2003.61 Of these, sixty-nine (or 73 percent) reported at least six
months of back returns, and forty-seven (or 49 percent) reported at
62
least twelve months of back returns.
A fund company can also delay reporting the existence of
registered funds to the Center for Research in Securities Prices
("CRSP"), another creator of databases of mutual fund information.
The CRSP Survivor Free Mutual Fund Database contains
approximate information about when a fund began operations and
when it was terminated. Like Morningstar, it relies upon fund
sponsors to inform it of the existence of a new fund. Wisen and Young
found that relatively new funds make up a very low percentage of
terminations in this database. For example, from 1993 to 1999, only 9
percent to 12 percent of the terminated funds in the database were
less than eighteen months old. In contrast, 40 percent to 43 percent of
the terminated funds were eighteen to thirty-six months old. 63 One
possible explanation for this difference is that fund sponsors delay
reporting many new funds to CRSP and that many new funds are
64
terminated before their existence is ever reported to CRSP.
B. Performanceof IncubatorFunds
Though incubator funds that are eventually taken public do
outperform during their incubation period comparable seasoned funds,
they do not continue to outperform after being sold to the public.
Given how incubation-period performance is manipulated, the
marketing to investors of funds based on their incubation-period
returns is inherently misleading.
1. During Incubation, Incubator Funds Outperform Other Funds
Studies have uniformly found that, during incubation,
incubator funds significantly outperform other funds. In his large
sample of domestic equity mutual funds, Evans identified the
"incubated" funds as those with at least twelve months between their
inception date and when they received a ticker symbol. He found that
those funds had 9.8 percent higher annualized returns during their

61. Carl Ackermann & Tim Loughran, Mutual Fund Incubation and the Role of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 70 J. BUS. ETHICS 33, 34 (2007).
62. Id. at 35 & tbl.2.
63. Wisen & Chiang, supranote 56, at 54-55 & exh.1.
64. Id. at 54. Other possible explanations are that new funds are terminated less frequently
because they perform better than older funds or because fund sponsors often give a grace period
to new funds before deciding to terminate them. Id.
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incubation period than non-incubated funds did during their own first
three years of operation. 65 When adjusted for risk, the difference in
annualized returns was smaller, although generally still significant,
ranging from 1.4 percent to 3.5 percent, depending on which risk66
adjusted measure was used.
Using Evans's definition of "incubated funds," Garavito also
compared the performance of actively managed domestic equity funds
that had been incubated to the performance of those funds that had
never been incubated. He found that incubated funds outperformed
non-incubated funds by a statistically significant 2.7 percent per year
on a risk-adjusted basis during each fund's first three years of
existence. 67 Note, however, that because incubation periods are often
less than three years, many of the incubated funds' returns likely
included post-incubation-period returns.
Ackermann and Loughran defined incubation-period returns as
returns occurring before the fund appeared in Morningstar. They
examined ninety-five domestic equity funds that appeared in
Morningstar's database for the first time from 2000 to 2003. They
found that those funds had a statistically significant, 1.8 percent
better return than the overall stock market68 in their last month of
incubation (i.e., the month prior to appearing in Morningstar). Those
funds also had a 3.6 percent better return than the market during
69
their last twelve months of incubation.
Taking an even broader look at the performance of new funds,
Wisen and Chiang compared the performance of "new" and "seasoned"
domestic growth funds that appeared in Morningstar's database from
1994 through 1999. They defined new funds as those that were no
more than nine months old and seasoned funds as those more than
twelve months old. They found that the new funds had higher riskadjusted returns than even the smallest quartile of similar, seasoned
funds. The new funds' outperformance ranged from 0.27 percent to
0.85 percent per month, depending on whether they were largecapitalization, medium-capitalization, or small-capitalization funds. 70
65. Evans, supra note 53, at 17 & tbl.II.
66. Id.
67. Fabian Garavito, Mutual Fund Incubation: Innovation or Marketing Tool 9 (Dec. 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344642).
68. They compared funds' returns to the average return of the CRSP value-weighted
market index over the same period. Ackermann & Loughran, supra note 61, at 35 & tbl.2.
69. Id. Because only forty-seven funds in their sample had at least twelve months of backreturns, the 3.6 percent difference between these returns and the overall stock market was not
statistically significant. Id.
70. New large-capitalization growth funds outperformed similarly-sized, seasoned largecapitalization growth funds by 0.27 percent per month; new middle-capitalization growth funds
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These results likely understate the true difference between new and
seasoned fund returns because the study included only seasoned funds
still operating at the end of 1999; seasoned funds terminated before
then were not included. Because funds that perform poorly are more
likely to be terminated than those that perform well, a survivorship
bias, which inflates the average returns of the seasoned funds, exists
71
in the data.
Wisen and Chiang's data, however, do not distinguish between
new funds sold to the public after an extended incubation period and
those funds brought to market soon after inception. As a result, the
new fund returns represent a mix of incubation and post-incubation
returns. In addition, because incubation periods can extend beyond a
year, some of the seasoned funds' returns likely include incubationperiod returns. However, the new funds' returns contain many more
incubation-period returns than do the seasoned funds' returns. Thus,
the new funds' higher returns are evidence that incubation returns
are generally greater than later returns.
The strong performance of incubator funds may be increasing.
Arteaga, Ciccotello, and Grant compared the performance of "new"
and "established" aggressive growth mutual funds that appeared in
the Alexander Steele Mutual Fund Database from 1988 to 1997.72
They found that "new" funds (defined as those in their first full year of
operations) generally outperformed "established" funds. 73 They further
found that the outperformance of new funds increased during the
period studied and was particularly high toward the end. For example,
new funds actually underperformed established funds in 1988 and
1989, the first two years of their study. But new funds outperformed
established funds by a statistically significant 5.9 percent in 1996 and
4.4 percent in 1997, the final two years of the study. 74 As in Wisen and
Chiang's study, the data used by Arteaga, Ciccotello, and Grant did
not allow them to determine whether a fund had been incubated
before being sold to the public. As a result, some of the new fund
returns and some of the established fund returns very likely are a mix
outperformed similarly-sized, seasoned middle-capitalization growth funds by 0.85 percent per
month; and new small-capitalization growth funds outperformed similarly-sized, seasoned smallcapitalization growth funds by 0.70 percent per month. Wisen & Chiang, supra note 56, at 59
exh.4.
71. Id. at 56, 59 exh.4.
72. The database was compiled by the Kiplinger Investment Advisory Group. Kenneth R.
Arteaga, Conrad S. Ciccotello & C. Terry Grant, New Equity Funds:Marketing and Performance,
54 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 43, 44 (1998).

73. Id. at 46 tbl.2.
74. Id. at 45 tbl.1. The underperformance of new funds in 1988 was not statistically
significant. Id.
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of incubation and non-incubation-period returns. However, the new
funds' returns contain many more incubation-period returns than do
the "established" funds' returns. Thus, this study is further evidence
that incubation returns are generally greater than later returns.
In summary, there is significant evidence that, at least among
funds that are eventually sold to the public, funds in their incubation
period outperform older, comparable funds.
2. After Incubation, Incubator Funds Do Not Continue to Outperform
Other Funds
Although, during their incubation period, incubator funds that
are eventually taken public outperform comparable funds, they
generally do not continue to do so afterward. The same studies that
identified high incubation-period returns generally found lower
returns once these incubator funds are sold to the public.
As noted above, in his study of domestic equity funds, Evans
found that incubation-period returns were 9.8 percent higher
(annualized) than those of similar non-incubated funds. However, in
the three years after incubation, incubated funds had a 3.2 percent
lower annualized return than did non-incubated funds during their
own first three years of existence. 75 When adjusted for risk, the
incubated funds outperformed the non-incubated funds slightly-from
0.03 percent to 2.9 percent annualized, depending on which riskadjusted measure was used-but only under one of the three risk76
adjusted measures was this difference statistically significant.
Also, recall that Garavito found that incubated domestic equity
funds outperformed non-incubated funds by approximately 2.7 percent
per year on a risk-adjusted basis during each fund's first three years
of existence. However, he also found that in the three years after being
taken public, incubated funds did not significantly outperform nonincubated funds. This finding indicates that incubation-period
outperformance does not continue after the fund is sold to the general
77
public.
Similarly, Ackermann and Loughran's sample of domestic
equity funds did not continue their strong performance after
incubation. Recall that these funds outperformed the market by 3.6
75. Evans, supranote 53, at 18 & tbl.II.
76. Id. In addition, after incubation, the incubated funds' Sharpe Ratio-a measure of
excess return per unit of risk-was significantly lower than that of the non-incubated funds.
During incubation, the incubated funds' Sharpe Ratio was significantly higher than that of the
non-incubated funds. Id. at 17-18 & tbl.II.
77. Garavito, supra note 67, at 9.
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percent in their last twelve months of incubation (i.e., the twelve
months prior to appearing in Morningstar) and by 1.8 percent in their
last month of incubation. 78 In the first month after inclusion in
Morningstar, however, they outperformed the market by only a
statistically insignificant 0.6 percent. These funds then quickly fell
behind, underperforming the market by a statistically significant 4.2
79
percent in the first year after their inclusion in Morningstar.
Lack of performance persistence also held true for the
aggressive growth funds studied by Arteaga, Ciccotello, and Grant.
They found that "new" funds (defined in their article as those funds in
their first year of operations) did not continue to outperform
"established" funds but instead reverted to the mean. In their study,
only 48.6 percent of the new funds that outperformed established
funds in their first full year of operations also outperformed them in
80
the next year.
In addition, the authors were able to identify definitively five
mutual funds as incubator funds and determine the exact dates that
these funds began operations and when they were opened to the
public. They found that these five funds outperformed the S&P 500 by
an average of 8.0 percent (annualized) during their incubation period
but underperformed the S&P 500 by an average of 4.0 percent
(annualized) after they were opened to the public. 8' Although a very
small sample, the data from these five funds again demonstrate that
strong incubation-period performance generally does not continue
after a fund is opened to the public.
In summary, funds that are eventually taken public perform
strongly during their incubation periods. However, this performance
generally does not continue after the funds are opened to the public.
We next turn to why strong incubation-period performance does not
persist.
3. Incubator Funds' Strong Performance Does Not
Continue for Multiple Reasons
Why do new funds sold to the public have superior performance
during their incubation periods, but only middling performance
thereafter? Two likely explanations exist. First, fund sponsors often
78. Ackermann & Loughran, supra note 61, at 35 tbl.2.
79. Id.
80. Arteaga et al., supranote 72, at 45-46 & tbl.3.
81. Id. at 47-48 & tbl.5. The five funds were the John Hancock Global Marketplace,
Putnam New Value, State Street Aurora, Transamerica Premier, and Van Kampen American
Capital Growth funds. Id. at 48 tbl.5.
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give incubator funds preferential treatment during their incubation
periods. Second, a selection bias exists: funds that have strong
incubation-period performances are more likely to be sold to the
public. However, strong incubation-period performance is largely just
a matter of luck, and this luck generally does not continue after the
incubation period ends. This section discusses both explanations.
a. Fund Companies Give IncubatorFunds PreferentialTreatment
During Incubation
Fund companies often favor new funds during incubation to
generate investor-attracting higher returns. One type of preferential
treatment is the overallocation by the fund sponsor of oversubscribed
initial public offerings (i.e., so-called "hot IPOs") to its incubator
funds.8 2 Because an incubator fund is very small, even a minor
allocation of hot IPO shares can significantly boost its returns.8 3 Thus,
by allocating hot IPO shares to an incubator fund, the sponsor can
increase the fund's returns during the incubation period.
Evidence exists that fund sponsors overallocate hot IPOs to
their incubator funds, and such overallocation artificially boosts their
incubation-period returns. In their study comparing the returns of
new growth funds (which include more incubation-period returns) to
those of comparable seasoned growth funds, Wisen and Chiang found
that new funds' returns were more sensitive to IPOs' first-day returns
than were seasoned funds' returns.8 4 This greater sensitivity indicates
that new funds contained a greater percentage of IPOs than did

82. For many reasons, a corporation's first sale of stock to the general public (i.e., its IPO) is
often intentionally underpriced to ensure that the stock's price will immediately rise. Sean J.
Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing:Legal and Economic Analysis of the PreferentialAllocation
of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 590-623 (2004). Because the IPO is
offered at too low of a price, people offer to buy more IPO shares than are available; in other
words, the IPO is oversubscribed. Someone who is able to buy the stock at the initial price (its
"offering price") is therefore virtually assured of a profit in the short-term because the excess
demand for the IPO will cause the stock's price to rise immediately after the IPO is publicly
traded. Id. at 593 n.29. A mutual fund sponsor that receives an allocation of an oversubscribed
IPO at its offering price can choose how to distribute the IPO shares among the funds it
sponsors. Edward Wyatt, It's a Fund!: Bringing Up Baby Mutuals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, §
3,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/16fbusiness/it-s-a-fund-bringing-up-baby.
mutuals.html?pagewanted=all.
83. Arteaga et al., supra note 72, at 44.
84. An IPO's first-day return is the increase in the stock price on the first day it is traded
publicly. Thus, an IPO's first-day returns is a measure of degree to which the IPO is underpriced;
the more underpriced an IPO is, the more its price will rise when it is first publicly traded. Wisen
& Chiang, supra note 56, at 60, 61 exh.5.
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seasoned funds.8 5 As we discuss below, the SEC has taken
enforcement action against a few egregious cases of overallocation of
hot IPOs to new funds. Wisen and Chiang's study, however, indicates
that the overallocation of hot IPOs is a more widespread problem than
the infrequency of the SEC's enforcement actions suggests.
Another way that fund companies boost the returns of their
incubator funds is by keeping them very small during incubation. To
the extent that strong incubation performance reflects stock-picking
skill,8 6 managers have difficulty in continuing to exhibit this skill after
the fund's size grows dramatically when the fund is marketed to the
public.
Successful incubator funds typically grow markedly when they
are sold to the general public. Evans found that after obtaining a
ticker symbol, which allowed them to be sold to the public, the median
87
size of incubator funds more than quadrupled.
Managers of large funds may have greater difficulty producing
superior returns than do managers of small funds because they have
fewer investment options. For example, a small amount of money can
easily be invested in a stock with a low market capitalization.
However, investing a much larger sum in the same stock is difficult:
there may not be enough shares on the market. And, even if there are,
a large purchase of a thinly traded stock would have to be made at a
much higher price than would a small purchase.8 8 Indeed, a study by
Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik found a significant negative
relationship between fund size and returns for funds that invest in
89
small-capitalization stocks.
The fact that many mutual funds close-i.e., refuse to accept
new investors upon reaching a certain size-indicates that fund
companies believe that increasing a fund's size makes strong
performance less likely. Even though management fees are directly
related to fund size and there are great economies of scale in

85. In particular, they found that new large-cap and mid-cap growth funds' returns were
approximately twice as sensitive to IPO first-day returns as were seasoned large-cap and midcap growth funds' returns. New small-cap growth funds' returns had approximately the same
sensitivity as did seasoned small-cap growth funds' returns, with the exception of the smallest
small-cap growth funds. Id. at 61 exh.5.
86. In the next section, we point out that strong incubation-period performance generally
reflects good luck rather than skill. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
87. Evans, supra note 53, at 16.
88. Joseph Chen, Harrison Hong, Ming Huang & Jeffrey D. Kubik, Does Fund Size Erode
Mutual Fund Performance? The Role of Liquidity and Organization, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1276,
1277 (2004).
89. Id.
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managing mutual funds, 90 these companies believe that at some point
a fund's size can become too large of a drag on its returns. 91
Other evidence exists that larger fund size makes strong
performance more difficult to achieve. 92 Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers
examined the lifetime performance of 2,076 actively managed
domestic equity funds that existed at any time between 1975 and
2006. They found that a small yet statistically significant percentage
(2.4 percent) of domestic equity funds exhibits short-run investing
skill after expenses, but a statistically insignificant percentage (0.6
percent) exhibits any investing skill in the long run.93 This difference
might be explained by investors flocking to funds that outperformed in
the short run. Such a surge of capital would force fund managers to
invest much more than before and thus make the funds unable to
94
continue outperforming in the long run.
Fund companies favor incubator funds in another way too.
Because an incubator fund is seeded with the company's or its
insiders' own money, it does not need to worry about shareholders
withdrawing money from the fund. A lack of concern about
withdrawal gives the incubator fund several advantages over other
funds. First, the fund can be more fully invested in stocks and other
securities because it need not keep cash on hand for shareholder
redemptions. Second, it can invest in less liquid securities. For
example, stocks that are thinly traded are costly to buy and sell
because they often have large bid-ask spreads.9 5 An incubator fund
can invest more heavily in such stocks because it will not be forced by
shareholder redemptions to sell them later. Third, it can take greater
risk. During incubation the fund can hold riskier securities or a less

90. Id. at 1276-77.
91. Daniel C. Indro, Christine X. Jiang, Michael Y. Hu, & Wayne Y. Lee, Mutual Fund
Performance:Does Fund Size Matter?, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 74, 744 (1999).
92. Laurent Barras, 0. Scaillet & Russ R. Wermers, False Discoveries in Mutual Fund
Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas (May 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=869748).
93. Id. at 18-19, 35 tbl.II, 36 tbl.III.
94. Id. at 2 (noting that their empirical finding of little long-run skill supports Berk and
Green's long-run equilibrium theory, which predicts that funds that exhibit short-run skill will
receive so much new investment that they will not be able continue to outperform other funds in
the long run).
95. The bid-ask spread of a stock is "the difference between the highest bid and the lowest
offer [for the stock] quoted on an exchange." Jeffry L. Davis & Lois E. Lightfoot, Fragmentation
Versus Consolidation of Securities Trading: Evidence from the Operation of Rule 19c-3, 41 J.
LEGAL ECON. 209, 214 n.26 (1998).
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diversified portfolio because even if such a strategy is unsuccessful,
96
the fund shareholders will not redeem their shares.
There is evidence that incubator funds take advantage of the
lack of shareholder redemptions. Garavito found that funds "tend to
97
hold more illiquid and lesser-known securities during incubation."
He also found that during incubation, funds' portfolios have greater
idiosyncratic risk but less systematic risk (e.g., exposure to market
risk, value stocks, and momentum strategies). 98 In addition, he found
that incubated funds' portfolios are a little more concentrated than
those of non-incubated funds. 99
b. Fund Companies Select Strong-Performing
Incubator Funds to Sell to the Public
The method by which incubator funds are selected for
marketing to the public makes incubator funds perform better during
their incubation period than after. Luck is a major factor in the
performance of mutual funds. Funds often perform well over a
particular time period-including during incubation-because of
simple luck, and not because of the fund manager's stock-picking skill.
Because fund sponsors generally choose to take public the funds
having strong incubation-period returns, incubator funds that are sold
to the public have been lucky, as a group. However, their luck-and
their corresponding high returns-generally does not continue after
the funds are taken public. Fund companies' method of marketing
incubator funds hides the large role that luck plays in incubation
returns. They market a disproportionate number of the lucky,
successful incubator funds and do not inform investors that those
funds have been culled from many unsuccessful, hidden incubator
funds. Thus, investors cannot infer the great role that luck plays in an
incubator fund's performance.

96. Garavito, supra note 67, at 13 ("[T]he incubation period allows funds to take on
investment strategies that [they] would not be able to implement otherwise. The advantage of
the incubation period is that ....managers have a high degree of certainty, that bad temporary
performance is not going to cause redemptions and the negative costs associated with it."); see
also Roger M. Edelen, Investor Flows and the Assessed Performance of Open-end Mutual Funds,
53 J. FIN. ECON. 439 (1999) (estimating that providing liquidity to fund investors reduces fund
returns by approximately 1.4 percent annually).
97. Garavito, supra note 67, at 13.
98. Id. at 9. Similarly, Evans found that the median total risk and idiosyncratic risk-but
generally not systematic risk--of incubator funds during incubation was slightly higher than
after incubation and slightly higher than those of non-incubated funds. Evans, supra note 53, at
19-20 & tbl.III.
99. Garavito, supra note 67, at 11.
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Luck's role in mutual fund performance should not be
underestimated. Because thousands of equity mutual funds exist, a
very large number of funds would outperform market indexes even if
all fund managers were picking their portfolios randomly. Recent
studies have quantified the role of luck. 100 As noted above, Barras,
Scaillet, and Wermers examined the lifetime performance of 2,076
actively managed domestic equity funds that existed at any time
between 1975 and 2006. They found that, after expenses, only 2.2
percent of funds had statistically significant, abnormal long-term
positive returns. 10 1 However, when the authors accounted for lucki.e., the fact that out of 2,076 funds, many would outperform solely due
to luck-only 0.6 percent of funds actually exhibited skill in their longterm performance. 10 2 This result was not even statistically significant,
so there was not persuasive evidence that any fund managers are
10 3
skillful enough to outperform their benchmarks in the long run.
Fama and French's study of domestic equity mutual funds'
returns from 1984 to 2006 reached a similar and perhaps even
stronger conclusion. 0 4 They found that luck could easily explain highreturning funds' performance and concluded that "there is no evidence
05
of fund managers with skill sufficient to cover costs."'
Although luck plays a major role in fund performance, this role
is hidden from investors in newly public incubator funds. Studies have
found that fund sponsors are much more likely to take public their
strong-performing incubator funds than their weak-performing
incubator funds. For example, Evans compared a sample of 172
incubator funds opened to the public to a sample of fifty incubator
10 6
funds that were terminated before ever being opened to the public.

100. Barras et al., supranote 92, at 2.
101. Id. at 16, 35 tbl.II.
102. Id. at 35 tbl.II. Luck was accounted for using a "False Discovery Rate" approach. This
approach uses the p-values associated with the t-statistics of the estimated alphas of 2,076
mutual funds to estimate what percentage of high-performing funds are just lucky. For a full
description of this approach, see id. at 4-10.
103. Id. at 16. They found slightly more evidence of short-run skill: a statistically significant
2.4 percent of the funds exhibited skill over five-year periods. Id. at 36 tbl.III.
104. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Luck versus Skill in the Cross Section of Mutual
Fund Alpha Estimates (Mar. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.
comabstract=1356021).
105. Id. at 22.
106. Richard B. Evans, Does Alpha Really Matter? Evidence from Mutual Fund Incubation,
Termination and Manager Change 7, 30 tbl.1 (June 15, 2006) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/evansr/pdf/do mf-riskadjust.pdf). In the study,
Evans defined incubator funds as funds that both (1) had a lag between their inception date and
the first time they were reported to the Morningstar and CRSP mutual fund databases (in other
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He found that the opened funds had over 13 percent greater
annualized returns during their incubation periods than did the nonopened funds. 10 7 Even controlling for other factors, a fund's returns
during its incubation period were a major factor in the decision to
open the fund to the public. A 1 percent increase in incubation returns
increased by 8 to 11 percent the probability that the fund would be
1 08
opened to the public.
In addition, fund companies tend to be strategic in choosing
when to open an incubator fund to the public. Garavito's study of
domestic equity incubator funds found that fund companies tend to
open these funds to the public around the time their twelve-month
performance relative to other funds is near its peak. 0 9
The speed with which fund companies provide fund data to
fund database vendors provides further evidence that fund companies
select strong-performing incubator funds over weak performers for
sale to the public. Wisen and Chiang's study measuring the lag
between a fund's inception date and its first appearance in
Morningstar indicated that fund companies quickly bring their strong
performers to the public's attention but wait to publicize weaker
performers. 1 0 They found that during the six months following their
inception, new funds that were "timely additions" to Morningstar
(those first listed within fifteen months of their inception) were much
more likely to have outperformed than have underperformed similar,
seasoned funds. 1' In contrast, "retroactive additions" (new funds first

words, there existed an incubation period), and (2) had, during that incubation period, the fund
family as its principal shareholder, owning more than 25 percent of the fund. Id. at 6.
107. Id. at 7, 30 tbl.1. Interestingly, the incubated funds that were eventually sold to the
public had an average annualized risk-adjusted return during their incubation period only about
2-4 percent higher (depending on the measure of risk-adjusted return) than did incubated funds
that did not go public. Id. This is evidence that fund sponsors understand that investors pay
little attention to a fund's risk.
108. Id. at 8, 34 tbl.2. Other factors controlled for were the fund family's size, whether the
family already had a fund with the same investment objective, the amount of time the fund had
incubated, the fund's risk-adjusted return, and the total amount of flow industry-wide into funds
with that investment objective. Id. The incubated fund's risk-adjusted return-unlike the total
return-had no statistically significant effect on the decision to open a fund to the public. Id.
109. Garavito, supra note 67, at 17-18.
110. Wisen & Chiang, supra note 56, at 60. Recall that Morningstar relies upon the fund
sponsor to notify it regarding the existence of a new fund. Thus, by delaying this notification, a
fund sponsor can delay a new fund's inclusion in Morningstar. Id.
111. Wisen and Chiang examined the returns of timely additions in fourteen Morningstar
categories (such as large-cap growth) in each of the six months following the funds' inceptions,
for a total of eighty-four category-months. In sixteen of these category-months, the timely
additions' returns were statistically significantly different from those of similar, seasoned funds.
For fifteen of those sixteen category-months the new funds outperformed the seasoned funds; in
only one category-month did they underperform the seasoned funds. Id. at 60, 62, 63 exh.6.
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listed in Morningstar more than fifteen months after their inception)
were approximately as likely to have underperformed as outperformed
similar, seasoned funds. 112 Thus, even among incubator funds
eventually taken public, fund companies are quicker to publicize
strong performers than weak performers.
Because fund companies are more likely to market their highperforming than low-performing incubator funds to the public, fund
investors see a disproportionate number of successful incubator funds.
Many investors do not know that the incubator funds they are offered
have been culled from less successful incubator funds. Absent this
context, investors underestimate the large role that luck plays in
funds' strong incubation-period performance.
A recent experiment illustrates how investors are misled if
they see only a fund sponsor's successful funds. Koehler and Mercer
provided participants with an advertisement that highlighted the
strong past returns of two of a company's growth funds."1 3 One version
of the advertisement noted that the advertised funds were only two of
the company's thirty funds. Another version of the advertisement
stated that they were the company's only two funds. A third version
did not state how many funds the company had. Participants were
then asked about their perception of the fund company's quality and
the likelihood and amount that they would invest in a new growth
14
fund introduced by the company."
Participants who saw the version disclosing that the fund
company had thirty funds not only rated the fund company's quality
lower but were also less willing to invest in the company's new fund at
all, and they were only willing to invest less. 1 5 In other words, they
were likely less impressed by the two advertised high-performing
funds because they knew that they had been selected from a pool of
thirty funds run by the company.
Importantly, participants who saw the advertisement that did
not state how many funds the company operated acted like the
participants who saw the advertisement stating that the fund
company had only two funds. They rated the fund company's quality

112. They examined the returns of retroactive additions in the same fourteen Morningstar
categories in each of the six months following the funds' inceptions, again for a total of eightyfour category-months. Id. In only five of these category-months were the retroactive additions'
returns statistically significantly different from those of similar, seasoned funds. Id. Also, in only
three of these five category-months did the retroactive additions outperform the seasoned funds;
in the other two category-months they underperformed the seasoned funds. Id.
113. Koehler & Mercer, supra note 47, at 1110-13.
114. Id. at 1110-11.
115. Id. at 1112-13.
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the same, had the same willingness to invest in the new fund, and
were willing to invest the same amount in the new fund. 116 In other
words, investors who were not told how many funds existed acted as if
they had been told that there were only two funds. This result
indicates that unless investors are told that advertised highperformers have been culled from lower-performers, they will act as if
no such selection has occurred.
In summary, luck plays a major role in the success of incubator
funds. However, luck's role is obscured from investors because fund
companies are much more likely to market their successful incubator
funds than their unsuccessful incubator funds. As a result, investors
see a disproportionate number of successful funds, causing them to
attribute this success to the fund managers' skill rather than luck.
In this section, we have shown that incubation appears to be
widespread, and that tools for creating new funds with strong
performance records are readily available to fund companies. By
favoring incubator funds and then selectively choosing which ones to
sell to the public, fund companies are able to report and market high
incubation-period returns. Investors, who generally flock to funds with
high returns, are drawn to these new funds.
However, marketing high incubation returns misleads
investors. If the new fund does not continue to be favored as it was
during incubation, investors will have been "baited and switched."
Investors are also often misled by high incubation returns because
these returns are unlikely to continue when the fund is sold to the
general public and grows dramatically. Even more importantly, fund
companies' tendency to take public only their strong-performing
incubator funds misleads investors by hiding the element of luck that
strongly undergirds incubation-period performance. By concealing
how funds are selected for sale to the public, fund companies mislead
investors regarding the importance of incubation-period returns.
III. SEC REGULATION OF INCUBATION
Using performance results generated
incubation process is deceptive and violates
which uniformly prohibit the sale of securities
or misleading information.1 1 7 Specifically,

through an undisclosed
federal securities laws,
using materially untrue
Rule 156 promulgated

116. Id.
117. Section 34(b)(1) of the Investment Company Act, echoing the language of Section 17 of
the Securities Act and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act, states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact in any registration statement, application, report, account,
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under the Securities Act of 1933 explains that performance data
presented without context in mutual fund sales literature can be
misleading under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
Representations [in sales literature] about past or future investment performance could
be misleading ... where [p]ortrayals of past income, gain, or growth of assets convey an
impression of the net investment results achieved by an actual or hypothetical
investment which would not be justified under the circumstances, including portrayals
that omit explanations, qualifications, limitations,
or other statements necessary or
1 18
appropriate to make the portrayals not misleading.

Despite the prohibitions against misleading disclosures in fund
prospectuses, shareholder reports, and sales literature, no SEC rule
specifically addresses fund incubation. In fact, none of the agency's
rulemaking dealing with performance data even mentions the term
"incubation."
This section begins with a description of the SEC's regulation
of the strategies that fund companies have used to inflate the
performance of incubator funds-specifically, overallocating hot IPOs
to them, keeping them very small, and restricting shareholder
redemptions. The SEC has done little to address these practices. We
then examine the SEC's limited and insufficient approach to
preventing investors from being misled by how fund companies select
the funds to market to the public.
A. PreferentialTreatment of IncubatorFunds
Despite studies revealing likely widespread inflation of
incubation-period performance through special treatment by fund
companies, the SEC has taken little action against this abuse. The
SEC has brought only two enforcement actions against companies for
manipulating the performance of new funds. Both were brought
almost ten years ago and dealt with the artificial boosting of fund
returns through large allocations of hot IPOs. Nor has the agency
required disclosure of the effect on fund returns of increasing fund size
and providing shareholders with liquidity, even though it has
generally acknowledged that funds are managed differently before
than after registration.

record, or other document filed or transmitted pursuant to this title ....
It
shall be unlawful for any person so filing, transmitting, or keeping any such
document to omit to state therein any fact necessary in order to prevent the
statements made therein, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, from being materially misleading.
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(b)(1) (2008).
118. 17 C.F.R. 230.156(b)(2)(i) (2008).
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1. SEC Enforcement Actions Have Targeted Only Extreme Allocations
of Hot IPOs
The SEC has brought only two enforcement actions for
manipulation of new funds' performance. Both of these cases involved
artificially inflating a new fund's returns through large allocations of
hot IPOs. In each enforcement action, the SEC concluded that
marketing the funds to the public based on performance results that
were unlikely to continue was inherently misleading-and thus a
violation of both Section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act and
other securities laws. These enforcement actions also indicate that if
the SEC were to investigate fully fund incubation, it would conclude
that the marketing of incubator funds is often misleading.
a. Van Kampen (1999)
In a 1999 enforcement action, the SEC censured and fined the
Van Kampen Investment Advisory Corporation "for failing to disclose
material facts concerning the impact of hot IPOs on their 'incubator'
Growth Fund's 1996 performance."1' 19 The Van Kampen Growth Fund
began operating as an incubator fund in late December 1995 with seed
money provided by Van Kampen and affiliated individuals. 120 During
its incubation period, the fund usually had net assets of between
$200,000 and $380,000.121
For 1996, the great bulk of its incubation period, the Growth
Fund was the best-performing fund in its category according to Lipper
Analytical Services. 122 Its 62 percent total return was 20 percentage
points higher than any other fund in its category. 12 3 Partly as a result
of its high performance, Van Kampen decided to take the fund

public. 124
The fund was opened to the public in early February 1997,
approximately fourteen months after its inception. The fund's sales
literature highlighted its 62 percent return and that it was the best119. Press Release, Securities & Exchange Commission, Van Kampen Investment Advisory
Corp. and Former Secior Official Censured and Fined For Disclosure Violations Regarding
"Incubator" Growth Fund (Sept. 8, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
pressarchive/1999/99-111.txt. Van Kampen and its former Chief Investment Officer were
censured and fined $100,000 and $25,000, respectively. Id.
120. Van Kampen Inv. Advisory Corp., Investment Advisors Act of 1940 Release No. 1819,
Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 23996, 54 S.E.C. 355, 357 (Sept. 8, 1999).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 358.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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performing fund in its Lipper category. 125 The fund's semi-annual
shareholder report also reported the 62 percent return. 126 Likely
because of this strong performance, investors flocked to the fund,
causing its assets to skyrocket to over $110 million in less than six
weeks.127

Unknown to investors, however, much of the high incubation
returns were from hot IPOs that Van Kampen had allocated to the
fund. 128 An internal Van Kampen analysis found the Growth Fund's
1996 return would have been about one-third lower if the fund had
purchased the IPOs on the secondary market (i.e., at the true market
price), rather than having them allocated to the fund. 129 Moreover,
more than 50 percent of the fund's 1996 return came from IPOs.130
The Growth Fund's prospectus, shareholder report, and
advertising failed to disclose the great impact of IPOs on the fund's
performance.1 3 1 On the contrary, Van Kampen representatives made
statements to the press that explicitly denied that IPOs had a large
32
effect on the fund's performance.
The SEC found that disclosing the fund's incubation-period
performance without also disclosing the effect of the hot IPOs made
the registration statement and shareholder report materially
misleading. Van Kampen thus violated Section 34(b) of the
Investment Company Act and Section 206(2) of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940.133 The SEC reasoned that
disclosure that a large portion of the Growth Fund's return was attributable to its
investments in IPOs would have been material to an investor's decision whether to
invest in the Growth Fund, particularly in light of the fact that, given the growth in the
fund's total assets, it was questionable whether the fund could continue to experience,
by investing in hot IPOs, substantially similar performance as the fund had previously
experienced. 134

125. Id. at 359.
126. Id. at 360.
127. Id. at 359.
128. Id. at 358 n.3. The SEC defined "hot IPOs" as "securities that trade at a premium over
their initial public offering price immediately after the initial public offering."
129. Id. at 359.
130. Id. at 359 n.4. The SEC produced the 50 percent figure by calculating the fund's actual
gains on the IPO shares. We believe, however, that Van Kampen's one-third figure better
measures the subsidy that the fund received-if the fund had been forced to buy the IPOs on the
secondary market, the fund would not have received an advantage over other investors.
131. Id. at 361.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 361-62.
134. Id.
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b. Dreyfus (2000)
In a second enforcement action, the SEC charged The Dreyfus
Corporation in 2000 with failing to disclose the large role that IPOs
played in one of the company's new mutual funds. 135 The SEC
censured and fined both the company and an employee who managed
four Dreyfus funds, including the Dreyfus Aggressive Growth Fund
("DAG"), which was a very small, new fund. 136 The DAG's prospectus
during its first fiscal year stated that "[i]f... other [mutual funds
advised by Dreyfus] desire to invest in, or dispose of, the same
securities as [DAG], available investments or opportunities for sales
will be allocated equitably to each investment company."' 1 7 Despite
this claim, IPOs-and especially hot IPOs-were not allocated
equitably among the four funds. 138 Proportionate to their sizes, DAG
received an approximately thirty-seven-times greater allocation of
139
IPOs than did the other three funds.
As a result of its large IPO allocation, DAG was the top-ranked
fund of the 175 funds in Lipper's Capital Appreciation category at the
end of its first fiscal year, with a total return of 81.7 percent. 140 The
first-day returns from IPOs contributed approximately 70.3
percentage points--or 86 percent-of that total return.' 4 ' Dreyfus
advertised DAG's high first-year return and its top Lipper ranking,
but the advertisements did not disclose the IPOs' impact on this
performance.142 Unsurprisingly, investors flocked to this high
performance, increasing DAG's size from $2 million at its inception to
143
more than $154 million only eight months later.
The SEC found that, by failing to disclose the great effect that
the IPO allocation policy had on DAG's returns, Dreyfus had breached
its fiduciary duty to investors to disclose all material facts. 144 The SEC
noted that disclosure was required because it was "questionable
whether DAG could replicate its prior performance through continuing

135.
Release
2000).
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Dreyfus Corp., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 7857, Investment Advisors Act of 1940
No. 1870, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 24450, 54 S.E.C. 635 (May 10,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 636.
at 639.
at 640.
at 641-42.
at 642.
at 641.
at 644.
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to invest in IPOs as the fund grew larger."145 In addition, it found that
DAG's prospectus was materially false and misleading by claiming
146
that IPOs were allocated equitably among Dreyfus' funds.
In summary, the SEC's enforcement actions against Van
Kampen and Dreyfus-while salutary-must be kept in perspective.
They represent the only cases in which the SEC has challenged the
use of hot IPOs to boost artificially a new fund's returns. The SEC
seemed unaware of-and certainly incurious about-how widespread
the practice may be. As discussed before, new funds' returns in
general are more sensitive than seasoned funds' returns to IPO firstday returns, indicating that new funds' portfolios often contain a
greater percentage of IPOs than do other funds. 147 Thus, the Van
Kampen and Dreyfus cases likely are only extreme examples of a
common practice.
2. The SEC Does Not Require Disclosure of How Fund Size and
Shareholder Redemption Policies Affect Performance
Successful incubator funds, endowed with a strong
performance history, typically grow dramatically when sold to the
public. Even if strong incubation performance reflects some stockpicking skill, it becomes more difficult for the manager to continue to
exhibit this skill after the fund grows and shareholders are permitted
to redeem their shares on demand. 148 For example, it is much harder
for a large, open-ended fund that does not restrict shareholder
redemptions to significantly boost its returns by investing in small,
thinly traded stocks.
The SEC does not require disclosure of the effect of increasing
fund size or shareholder redemption policies on performance.
Nonetheless, the agency has recognized the effect of fund size, at least
in the context of the allocation of hot IPOs. When the SEC censured
and fined Van Kampen for not disclosing the large role that hot IPOs
played in its new Growth Fund's high returns, the SEC noted that
"given the growth in the fund's total assets, it was questionable
whether the fund could continue to experience, by investing in hot
IPOs, substantially similar performance as the fund had previously
experienced." 149 Because during its incubation phase the fund
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Wisen & Chiang, supra note 56, at 60, 61 exh.5.
148. See supra Part II.B.3.b.
149. Van Kampen Inv. Advisory Corp., Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 1819,
Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 23996, 54 S.E.C. 355, 361-62 (Sept. 8, 1999).
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generally had assets of only a few hundred thousand dollars, even a
small allocation of hot IPOs could-and did-greatly affect the fund's
performance. However, when the fund was marketed to the public and
grew to over $100 million, a dramatically larger allocation of hot IPOs
would have been necessary to sustain the fund's abnormally high
returns.
In addition, the SEC has acknowledged that "funds are likely
150
to be managed differently before they are offered to the public."
However, the SEC has not discussed whether it believes that funds'
growth and the need to provide liquidity to shareholders are reasons
that funds are managed differently after they are taken public.
In summary, nothing requires a small fund to warn investors
that its growth may hamper future returns. A very small incubator
fund that invested in small-capitalization stocks and was registered
with the SEC may baldly advertise its high incubation returns. Under
the SEC's current policy, such a fund need not disclose two forces that
will make it difficult for high returns to continue: that it is likely to
grow dramatically, and that it will have to be prepared for shareholder
redemptions.
B. Selective Marketing of IncubatorFunds
1. The SEC Generally Prohibits Marketing of Funds' Pre-Registration
Performance
Fund companies generally cannot report or advertise fund
performance data that precede the effective date of the fund's
registration. A fund prospectus must contain a bar chart and table
presenting the fund's returns over the past ten calendar years or the
life of the fund, whichever is shorter. In the instructions for preparing
this chart and table, the SEC explicitly requires that all of the
reported returns be "only for periods subsequent to the effective date
15
of the Fund's registration statement." '
Likewise, advertisements may disclose performance data
arising only after registration. Rule 482 promulgated under the
Securities Act of 1933 specifies that any advertising of fund
performance must include performance data for "the time period

150. Investment Company Act Release No. 16254 (Feb. 2, 1988).
151. Securities and Exchange Comission, Form N-1A, Information Required in a Prospectus:
Risk/Return Summary: Investments, Risks, and Performance (2)(c)(2)(ii), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-la.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
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during which the registration statement was in effect." 15 2
Advertisement of pre-registration performance is not permitted.
Curiously, when the SEC proposed its advertising rule, it
seemed unaware of the potential for incubation and misleading use of
manipulated pre-registration performance data. The original proposal
would have permitted performance data beginning when a fund
started "in business," thus permitting advertising of returns attained
before a fund was registered. Two prescient commentators, however,
urged that the SEC permit only post-registration performance data to
be advertised. In its final release accompanying Rule 482, the SEC
adopted these commentators' suggestion because "funds are likely to
153
be managed differently before they are offered to the public."
In summary, although fund companies generally cannot report
or advertise fund performance data that precede the effective date of
the fund's registration, the SEC rulemaking on disclosure and
advertising of performance data treated the possibility of incubation
as an afterthought. The SEC releases accompanying these rules did
not mention incubation, referring only in general terms to the
possibility that funds may be managed differently after they are
registered.
2. The SEC Sometimes Allows Funds to Market Performance Data
from Other Accounts and Funds
Funds are generally prohibited from using pre-registration
performance data in prospectuses, reports, and advertising. The SEC
staff, however, has issued a number of no-action letters permitting
new funds to report and advertise the returns of other related funds
and investment accounts. In doing so, the staff has assumed that
investors are not misled when performance data come from other
funds or accounts that were both (1) managed in a manner similar to
the new fund and (2) not created for the purpose of generating
performance records.
During the 1990s, the SEC staff changed its policy from merely
permitting new funds to use performance data of predecessor funds
and accounts to allowing such data from similarfunds and accounts as

152. 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(d)(3) (2008) (requiring that any "quotation of the company's
performance contained in an advertisement" be limited to "[a]verage annual total return for one,
five, and ten year periods, except that if the company's registration statement under the Act (15
U.S.C. 77a et seq.) has been in effect for less than one, five, or ten years, the time period during
which the registration statement was in effect is substituted for the period(s) otherwise
prescribed").
153. Advertising by Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 6753 (Feb. 2, 1988).
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well. In addition, the SEC staff extended this permission to allow such
data to be used not only in prospectuses but also in fund advertising.
The SEC staff seemed oblivious to the possibility that fund companies
could be misleading investors by selectively choosing which related
funds or accounts to use. Selection biases such as these are at the
heart of a major problem with incubation.
a. Funds Can Use PerformanceData of
PredecessorInvestment Accounts
In a 1995 no-action letter, the SEC's Division of Investment
Management permitted Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Company ("MassMutual") to market prior returns of unregistered
separate investment accounts when MassMutual converted the
154
accounts into registered mutual funds.
MassMutual had converted seven separate investment
accounts ("SIAs") exempt from registration under the Investment
Company Act into new mutual funds. 155 Each of the resulting seven
mutual funds had an "investment objective, policies and practices
15 6
designed to correspond to" those of its predecessor SIA.
The SEC permitted MassMutual to include each SIA's prior
returns as the corresponding mutual fund's historical returns in its
prospectus, statement of additional information, and sales material.
Thus, MassMutual permissibly adopted the SIA's prior, pre157
registration performance as the fund's own performance.
MassMutual agreed to include the disclosure that "the quoted
performance data includes the performance of the SIAs for periods
before the Trust's registration statement became effective." 158

154. MassMutual Inst., Funds, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 747, at *7
(Sept. 28, 1995).
155. The SIAs were investment vehicles for pension plans qualified under the Internal
Revenue Code § 401, and thus exempted from the Investment Company Act's definition of
"investment companies." Id. at *1 n.2. Each SIA held a portfolio of securities, which were
contributed to a new mutual fund in exchange for shares of the fund. As a result of the
transaction, each SIA owned shares of a mutual fund that owned the same portfolio of securities
that the SIA had previously owned directly. In addition, MassMutual provided $107,000 of initial
capital to each new fund. Id. at *14.
156. Id. at *1.
157. Id. at *7. These prior returns were adjusted to reflect the deduction of fees and expenses
that would have been applicable if the SIA had been a mutual fund. Id. at *4-5.
158. Id. at *4 n.5. They also included the disclosure that "the SIAs were not registered under
the 1940 Act and therefore were not subject to certain investment restrictions that are imposed
by the Act," and the disclosure that "if the SIAs had been registered under the 1940 Act, the
SlAs' performance may have been adversely affected." Id.
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The SEC staff offered two primary reasons for granting the noaction letter. First, MassMutual had represented that each fund
would be "managed in a manner that is in all material respects
equivalent to the management of the corresponding SIA."'159 Second,
the SIAs "were created for purposes entirely unrelated to the
160
establishment of a performance record."'
The SEC suggested that these reasons were consistent with the
intent of its rules that normally prohibit the use of pre-registration
returns. In one of its few and perhaps most lucid explanations of the
dangers of incubation, the staff explained that Rule 482(d)(3)'s
prohibition against advertising pre-registration returns was partly
intended to "preclude [a fund] adviser from establishing a number of
funds for the purposes of generating performance data, and then
registering those 'incubator funds' with the best performance records
so that the newly registered funds can use that performance."'161 In
addition, quoting the SEC release accompanying Rule 482, the staff
reiterated that the general prohibition against advertising preregistration performance was justified because "funds are likely to be
162
managed differently before they are offered to the public."'
In February 1997, sixteen months after the MassMutual noaction letter, the SEC again publicly explained its policy toward
incubator funds. Dr. William Greene, then a Department Chair at the
NYU Stern School of Business, asked the SEC whether a mutual fund
sponsor could create a number of incubator funds for the purpose of
creating performance track records-taking only the highest
performing funds public and advertising their high returns. 16 3 In
response, Jack Murphy, the Associate Director of the SEC's Division of
Investment Management, wrote that such a scenario would "raise

159. Id. at *7. The SEC cited a number of MassMutual representations as evidence that the
mutual funds were being managed the same as their predecessor SIAs. MassMutual was the
investment adviser for all of the funds and the SIAs. Also, each fund that had sub-advisers had
the same sub-advisers as its predecessor SIA. In addition, each fund had management practices,
investment policies, investment objectives, guidelines, and restrictions that were "in all material
respects" equivalent or identical to those of its predecessor SIA. Id. at *2-3.
160. Id. at *3. The evidence the SEC staff cited for this conclusion was the long length of
time between the establishment of the SLAs and their conversion into mutual funds. The SEC
noted that "[t]wo of the seven SIAs have existed for more than 20 years, and two others have
existed for more than 10 years. Of the other three SIAs, one was established in 1987, one in
1989, and one in 1991." Id.
161. Id. at *6.
162. Id. at *6 n.8.
163. Stern Sch. of Bus., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 316, at *1 (Feb. 3,
1997).

1522

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:5:1485

serious concerns under the antifraud provisions of the federal
'164
securities laws.
Murphy stated (without citation) that the SEC had
"consistently, for close to thirty years, expressed severe reservations"
regarding incubator funds. 165 He reiterated the SEC's two concerns
about incubator funds. First, they might be managed differently after
going public than they were during their incubation period. Second, a
fund sponsor might adopt the strategy suggested by Dr. Greene: create
multiple similar incubator funds and take only the most successful
166
one public without disclosing the performance of the other funds.
Murphy also wrote that the SEC's no-action letter to
MassMutual had been misrepresented by some of the media. He
emphasized that MassMutual had represented to the SEC that each of
its new mutual funds would be managed in "substantially the same
manner as its predecessor account" and that each of the funds'
predecessor accounts were "created for purposes entirely unrelated to
67
the establishment of a performance record."'
b. Spun-Off Funds Can Use PerformanceData of PredecessorFunds
In 2000, the SEC staff issued a no-action letter permitting
Janus Capital Corporation to include in the registration statements,
advertisements, sales literature, and prospectuses of new funds the
previous performance of registered funds from which the new funds
had been spun off. 168 One class of a number of registered Janus funds
169
had been created only for investments in qualified retirement plans.
Janus sought to make those funds also available for investments from
non-qualified retirement plans and thus spun off that class into new
170
funds that could accept such investments.
The SEC accepted Janus's argument that the use of the prior
performance data would not implicate "the primary concerns against
permitting a fund to present performance information prior to the
effective date of the fund's registration statement."'171 The SEC staff
reasoned that the spin-off was not for the purpose of presenting the

164. Id. at *3.
165. Id. at *1.
166. Id. at *2.
167. Id. at *2-3.
168. Janus Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 826, at *17 (Aug.
28, 2000).
169. Id. at *2.
170. Id. at *4.
171. Id. at *17.
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prior performance records and that the new funds were subject to the
same investment restrictions that were imposed on the predecessor
funds, which were also registered investment companies. 172 The staff
concluded that the new funds "effectively will operate as a
continuation of the [old funds] such that the performance history of
173
the [old funds] may be carried forward."
In a footnote to the no-action letter, the SEC staff indicated its
belief that, in certain situations, a fund spun off from another might
actually be required to disclose the performance of its predecessor
fund. 174 In addition, the letter noted that if Janus had sought to spin
off only a portion of a predecessor class of funds-rather than an
entire class of funds-then the staff might not have allowed the
175
performance data's use.
c. New Funds' Prospectuses Can Include Performance Dataof Similar
Non-PredecessorFunds and PrivateAccounts
Although the MassMutual and Janus scenarios involved
predecessor funds and accounts, the SEC has also allowed a new
mutual fund to report the performance of other mutual funds and
accounts that were not predecessors of the fund.
In a 1996 no-action letter to Nicholas-Applegate Mutual Funds,
the SEC staff permitted mutual funds to include in their prospectuses
the performance of private accounts managed by the funds' adviser
that had investment objectives, policies, and strategies substantially
similar to the new mutual funds. 176 Unlike MassMutual, these private
accounts were not converted into the mutual funds. Indeed, the
172. Id. at *14.
173. Id. at *17-18. Janus represented that, when presenting the new funds' performance, it
would disclose that each new fund had been previously organized as another fund, the date that
each new fund commenced operations, and that the reported information included performance
of the predecessor funds. Id. at *5.
174. For example, the SEC warned against a mutual fund that is spun off from a class of
another fund presenting performance information but failing "to [also] disclose adequately the
performance of the predecessor class (for example, as supplemental, non-standardized
performance information in the fund's registration statement, advertisements or sales
literature) .. " Id. at *18 n.19. The SEC stated that such a fund "could be deemed to have
omitted to state a fact necessary in order to make the statements in its registration statement,
advertisements or sales literature not materially misleading." Id.
175. Id. at *18.
176. Nicholas-Applegate Mut. Funds, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 674,
at *7 (Aug. 6, 1996). About a decade earlier, the SEC allowed funds in their first year of
operations to include in their prospectuses and advertisements the recent performance of similar
private accounts. However, this permission was formally limited to closed-end funds. Growth
Stock Outlook Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2026, at *10 (Apr. 15,
1986).
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private accounts continued to operate after the funds were created.
Because the private accounts were not predecessors of the mutual
funds, the funds were prohibited from reporting the private accounts'
historical performances as the funds' own performance. However, the
funds were permitted to report the private accounts' performance in
177
addition to their own performance.
At almost the same time, the SEC staff granted a no-action
letter to Bramwell Growth Fund. That letter permitted a mutual fund
to include the performance of another fund in its prospectus when (1)
both funds shared substantially similar investment objectives and
policies, and (2) the new fund's portfolio manager had previously
served as portfolio manager of the other fund. 178 Because the other
fund was not a predecessor of the manager's current fund, the
performance could be reported only in addition to the current fund's
own performance, as in the Nicholas-Applegate letter.179 Also, both the
Bramwell and Nicholas-Applegate no-action letters were limited to
including the information about similar funds' and private accounts'
returns in the fund prospectus.
d. New Funds'Advertisingand Supplemental Sales Literature Can
Include PerformanceData of Similar Non-PredecessorFunds and
Private Accounts
In 1997, the SEC staff granted a no-action letter to ITT
Hartford Mutual Funds permitting advertisements and supplemental
sales literature of new mutual funds to include returns of a company's
corresponding funds with investment objectives, policies, and
strategies similar to those of the new funds.18 0 The corresponding
funds were registered and used in the company's variable insurance
products, while the new funds were open to all investors. Tax laws
prevented those corresponding funds from being converted into the
181
new mutual funds.
On the same date, the SEC granted a no-action letter to GE
Funds allowing new mutual funds' advertisements and supplemental
sales literature to include returns of corresponding registered

177. Nicholas-Applegate Mut. Funds, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 674,
at *5-6 (Aug. 6, 1996).
178. Bramwell Growth Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 668, at *7
(Aug. 7, 1996).
179. Id. at *5-6.
180. ITT Hartford Mut. Funds, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 259, at *7-8
(Feb. 7, 1997).
181. Id. at *1-2.
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institutional funds and private institutional accounts.18 2 These
corresponding institutional funds and accounts had investment
objectives and policies substantially similar to those of the new
mutual funds, but unlike the new mutual funds they were open only to
83
institutional investors.
In summary, the SEC staff has shown some willingness to
allow fund companies to use performance data of certain other mutual
funds and private accounts regardless of whether they were the new
funds' predecessors. The staff has recognized that advertised
performance data can be manipulated through a selection process that
chooses to highlight only strong-performing funds' returns. But it has
not fully recognized that other funds' and accounts' performance data
can be manipulated in the same way. In none of the requests for noaction letters, for example, did fund companies seek to report and
advertise poor returns by "similar" funds and accounts.
The SEC incorrectly assumes that investors will not be misled
if the other funds and accounts were managed in a similar way to the
new fund and were not created for the purpose of producing a strong
performance record. However, investors can still be misled if they are
unaware of how the fund companies choose which other funds and
accounts to use. For example, a fund company could establish a
number of private investment accounts because of demand from
certain customers. Even if the account managers possessed no stockpicking skill, some of the accounts would likely perform well because
of luck. Because the accounts were not established for the purpose of
creating a track record, the SEC would permit the company to convert
the strong-performing accounts into mutual funds and advertise the
performance of the predecessor private accounts. However, unless
investors are also told of the weak-performing private accounts that
were not converted into mutual funds, they would be deceived into
believing that the managers of the converted funds have stock-picking
skill.
Without disclosing the performance of all the accounts and
funds from which new funds could have been converted or spun off,
fund companies provide investors with only a partial, biased picture of
a new fund's performance pedigree. The risk of deception exists
whenever a fund company can select which funds to bring to market
without fully disclosing its underlying selection process.

182. GE Funds, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 269, at *10 (Feb. 7, 1997).
183. Id. at *14.
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3. The SEC Does Not Regulate "Public" Incubation
As discussed above, the SEC generally prohibits funds from
marketing their pre-registration returns. Because funds must register
with the SEC before they can be sold to the public, this prohibition
prevents many incubator funds from marketing returns achieved
before the fund was publicly available.
However, fund companies can create an incubator fund,
register it with the SEC, yet neither advertise it nor obtain a ticker
symbol for it. Thus, although the fund would technically be public
because it is registered with the SEC, it would be effectively private.
Without a ticker symbol, the public would be unable to buy the fund,
and without advertisement few potential investors would even know of
the fund's existence. Indeed, some major fund companies have used
such an approach.184
Because such an incubator fund was registered during its
incubation period, the SEC's general prohibition against marketing
pre-registration performance does not apply to it. However, because it
is not actively marketed, potential investors will not be aware of the
fund during this "public" incubation period. As a result, if the fund
company chooses to market actively only the funds that have
performed well during their public incubation periods, investors will
be unaware that the lesser-performing funds existed. Unassuming
investors are thus likely to be misled into believing that the highperforming funds reflect managerial skill rather than luck. The SEC,
however, has not taken any steps to protect investors from such
misleading public incubation.
IV. ADDRESSING INCUBATION ABUSE

Incubator funds' returns can mislead investors in two ways.
First, returns arising from special treatment-i.e., hot IPO allocations,
the funds being kept very small, and shareholder redemptions being
restricted-are deceptive in the absence of disclosure that the special
treatment will not continue. Second, when the fund sponsor chooses to
market high- rather than low-performing incubator funds, it creates
the impression that the high performance reflects managerial skill
rather than luck.
This section discusses ways of addressing these problems.
Regulatory intervention is necessary because market forces have not
184. Wyatt, supra note 82 (giving examples of large fund companies that registered new
mutual funds with the SEC but kept them hidden from the general public until the funds had a
strong performance record that could be advertised).
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stopped incubation's misuse. One might expect fund companies that
do not misuse incubation to advertise this fact in order to give them a
competitive advantage over fund companies that do misuse
incubation.1 8 5 However, we have not discovered any instance of such
advertising.
Why have fund companies not used such advertising? One
reason might be that a fund company would be unlikely to recoup the
costs of such an effort. The fund company would have to educate
investors about incubation-what it is and how it can be misleadingas well as inform them that the company does not engage in the
practice. Advertising is costly, however, and it is unclear how many
investors would pay attention to such advertising and understand the
implications of fund incubation even if it were explained to them.
In addition, there is a potential free-riding problem. Even if a
company's education campaign is successful, the company may not be
able to recoup its investment. After investors were educated, other
companies that do not misuse incubation could advertise that they do
not misuse incubation either. These companies would obtain the
benefit of the first company's education efforts without having
incurred the costs of education. In addition, some companies misusing
incubation might stop doing so and then advertise that they do not
misuse incubation either.186
Whatever the reason, market forces are not stopping the abuse
of incubation. We next discuss what steps the SEC might take to
protect investors from this behavior.
A. Reforms That Address Special Treatment of IncubatorFunds
Fund companies often subsidize incubator funds by
overallocating hot IPOs to them. In addition, incubator funds are kept
very small and shareholder redemptions are restricted, often giving
them an advantage over larger, open-ended funds.

185. In a survey of fund companies, most denied ever incubating funds while others
admitting doing so or declined to answer. Jason Zweig et al., The Good, The Bad and The Ugly:
Which Fund Companies Put Investors First?,MONEY, Feb. 1, 2004, at 74.
186. For a fuller discussion of how such free-riding on educational efforts to correct consumer
misperceptions may prevent a seller from making such investments, see Oren Bar-Gill, The
BehavioralEconomics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 758-61 (2007).

1528

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:5:1485

1. The SEC Should Treat Overallocation of Hot IPOs as Inherently
Misleading, or At Least Require Its Disclosure
In fining and censuring two fund companies for failing to
disclose that returns of particular new funds were dramatically
boosted through hot IPOs, the SEC has addressed only two extreme
examples of a common practice. Wisen and Chiang's study showing
that new funds' returns are generally more sensitive to IPO first-day
returns provide clear evidence that new funds' portfolios contain a
87
greater percentage of IPOs than do other funds.
At the very least, the SEC should require all funds to disclose
what percentage of their incubation returns come from IPOsespecially hot IPOs. However, such disclosure still may not prevent
investors from being misled. Surveys show that fund investors are
uninformed about their mutual funds. For example, most investors do
not even know the type of mutual funds they own. 8 8 Capon,
Fitzsimons, and Rice found that 72 percent of the surveyed investors
did not know if their primary fund invests in domestic or international
securities, and 75 percent did not know whether the fund invests in
equity or fixed income securities. 8 9 Thus, investors might not read or
appreciate the significance of a disclosure that an incubator fund's
returns were boosted by a large allocation of hot IPOs.
A better approach, therefore, would be for the SEC to bring
enforcement actions against fund companies that significantly reduce
the allocation of hot IPOs to their funds after their incubation periods.
Because these funds' incubation returns were achieved using hot IPOs
and these allocations did not continue, the high incubation returns
reported by the funds mislead investors. The appropriate remedy
would be for the fund company to compensate the fund (and any
investors who have sold their shares) for any shortfall in postincubation returns due to the reduced allocation of hot IPOs.
2. The SEC Should Require Disclosure of the Effect of Fund Size and
Shareholder Redemption Policies on Performance
Incubator funds are typically kept very small and are shielded
from shareholder redemptions. This protection often gives them an
advantage relative to funds that are larger and must be prepared for
redemptions. However, when a strong-performing incubator fund is
marketed to the public, its resulting dramatic growth-and the
187. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
188. Capon et al., supra note 20, at 77.
189. Id. at 68.
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possibility of shareholder redemptions-make it difficult for the fund
to continue to generate high returns. This practice creates another
way to mislead investors by incubation-period returns.
One approach to addressing this problem would be to require
wherever a fund reports or advertises incubation returns to include a
warning such as, "These returns were achieved when the fund was
very small and had not been marketed to the general public. It
generally is more difficult for a fund to achieve high returns as it
grows." Such a warning is especially appropriate for funds, such as
small-capitalization equity funds, that face declining investment
options as fund size and shareholder redemptions increase.
B. Reforms That Address Selective Marketing of Incubator Funds
Investors are also misled by the selective marketing of
incubator funds. Funds with strong incubation performance records
are actively marketed to the public, while funds with weak track
records are never seen. This selective marketing creates the illusion
that managerial skill, rather than luck, is behind the high-performing
funds. A number of possible solutions to this problem exist.
1. The SEC Could Require Disclosure of the Existence and
Performance of All Incubator Funds
One solution to selective marketing would require fund
companies to disclose the existence and returns of all of their
incubator funds. For example, when an incubator fund is taken public
and a company reports and advertises its incubation-period returns, 190
the fund's prospectus and advertising would also disclose the returns
of the fund company's other incubator funds over the same time
period. Such disclosure would provide a context for the incubation
returns of the newly public fund and indicate whether the new fund's
returns were representative of the returns of all of the company's
incubator funds.
However, such a policy would pose several difficulties. First,
there would be questions about which returns must be disclosed. For
example, in the MassMutual no-action letter, separate accounts were
converted into mutual funds. Similarly, with ITT Hartford, insurance
funds were copied into new mutual funds. Thus, to be comprehensive,
a fund company would have to disclose the returns of all its separate

190. Recall that the SEC generally does not allow pre-registration incubation returns to be
reported, but has created some exceptions to this policy.
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accounts and insurance funds as well. Such an approach might
overwhelm already confused investors.
In addition, even if the returns of non-public incubator funds
were disclosed, investors might not understand the implications. The
message intended by including the returns of other incubator funds is
that the advertised high-performing incubator fund may have been
lucky. If the company's other incubator funds did not perform well, the
existence of one high-performing fund should not be considered
significant evidence of managerial skill. However, this message is
subtle, and investors might miss it. Even though studies have found
little evidence that funds that have performed well in the past
continue to perform well, investors still flock to high-performing
funds. Koehler and Mercer's recent experiment, however, suggests
that providing investors with such context may be helpful.' 91 Thus,
informing investors about the number and performance of the funds
and accounts from which the offered fund was selected may lead
investors to discount high incubation performance. Giving context for
the high incubation returns may make investors less likely to
192
attribute these returns to skill and thus less likely to be misled.
Of course, to facilitate investor understanding, the purpose of
the disclosure could be made more explicit. For example,
advertisements of incubation-period returns could be required to
include the following warning:

191. See Koehler & Mercer, supra note 47. Recall that in their experiment they provided
participants with a fund company's advertisement that highlighted the strong past returns of
two of the company's funds. One version of the advertisement stated that the advertised funds
were only two of the company's thirty funds. Another version stated that those were the
company's only two funds. A third version of the advertisement did not state how many funds the
company had. A fourth version (the control) did not mention the funds' past returns at all.
Investors were then asked their perception of the quality of the fund company and the likelihood
and amount that they would invest in a new fund being introduced by the company.
Participants who saw the version that stated the fund company had only two funds and those
who saw the version that did not state how many funds existed responded similarly. However,
participants who viewed the advertisement disclosing that the fund company had thirty funds
rated the fund company's quality lower, were less willing to invest in the company's new fund,
and were willing to invest only a smaller amount in the new fund. In fact, they did not respond
differently from participants who viewed the control advertisement, which lacked any
information about past performance. In other words, they "gave little weight to the excellent (but
selected) performance data that they saw in the ad." Koehler & Mercer, supra note 47, at 1113.
192. Two studies reached opposite conclusions regarding whether investors already
somewhat discount performance data from fund companies that incubate. Garavito found that
funds that were incubated receive less flow than similar-performing funds that were not
incubated. Garavito, supra note 67, at 19-20, 34 tbl.8. Evans, however, found that investors don't
differentiate between incubated and non-incubated funds with similar past returns. Evans,
supra note 53, at 23 & tbl.IV.
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This fund was selected to be marketed by its sponsor from a number of other new funds
it operates, many of which did not have as high returns. Studies show that a new fund's
strong initial performance usually does not persist. A fund's performance is often a
matter of chance.

2. The SEC Could Prohibit Use of Incubation-Period Performance
Data
Another possible solution is to prohibit funds from reporting
and advertising performance data from their incubation periods. A
complete prohibition would prevent much of the current abuse of
incubator funds. A fund sponsor would have no incentive to create an
incubator fund for the purpose of creating a strong track record if it
could not market that track record later. Similarly, it would eliminate
the incentive to overallocate hot IPOs to incubator funds because the
resulting higher returns could not be marketed.
A primary objection to banning reporting and advertising of
incubation-period returns is likely that investors want to know these
returns. Many investors considering investing in a newly public fund
will be interested in the fund's incubation-period returns. Indeed,
investors' tendency to chase past returns shows the great weight that
193
they give to past performance.
A second possible objection is that incubation helps fund
19 4
companies test new investment strategies or new fund managers.
For example, a senior managing director at Putnam Investments, a
major mutual fund company, has argued that it is "'very important' to
incubate funds before bringing them to market. 'We believe we have a
fiduciary responsibility to prove an investment concept' before selling
new funds based on it.' 195 Also, Garavito found that during incubation,
funds invest in more illiquid and lesser-known stocks and hold a more
concentrated portfolio than do non-incubated funds. This is consistent
with fund companies using incubation to investigate lesser-known
96
stocks.'
However, neither of these objections justifies the reporting or
advertising of incubation-period returns. Investors desire past
performance data because they believe high past returns foretell high
future returns. However, this belief is generally erroneous. Studies
show that incubator funds that outperformed comparable funds
193. See supraPart I.B.1.
194. Garavito, supra note 67, at 21.
195. Mark Hulbert, Strategies: Survival of the Fittest? Or Is That Lion a Lamb?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2004, § 3, available at 2004 WLNR 5662248 (Westlaw) (quoting Stephen Oristaglio,
Senior Managing Dir., Putnam Invs.).
196. Garavito, supra note 67, at 13-14.
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during their incubation period do not continue to do so after. 197 Thus,
rather than provide valuable information to investors, the high
incubation-period returns actually mislead them. Also, the failure of
high incubation returns to predict post-incubation performance
demonstrates that incubation-period returns provide a poor test of an
investment concept or a fund manager. 198
In addition, a company can test a strategy or a fund manager
by using a simulated mutual fund instead of a real incubator fund.
The manager can manage a hypothetical portfolio, and the company
could determine what that portfolio's returns would have been had the
fund been real.
Finally, if a fund company truly believes that real incubationperiod performance provides it with valuable information, it would
still be permitted to use incubation, but it just could not report or
advertise the incubation-period performance to potential investors.
3. The SEC Should Broadly Define "Incubation"
Regardless of which steps are taken to regulate incubator
funds, the SEC must use a broader definition of "incubation." Any
regulation could be circumvented if incubation-period returns are
defined only as those occurring before a fund is registered with the
SEC. For example, the SEC restricts the advertising of incubation
returns by generally prohibiting the advertising of pre-registration
returns. However, a fund company can avoid this restriction by
registering an incubator fund with the SEC but not advertising or
obtaining a ticker symbol for the fund. Although the fund would
technically be public because it is registered, it would be effectively
private and thus hidden from potential investors. Indeed, major fund
companies have sometimes used this approach. 199
To prevent such easy circumvention, the SEC must define
incubation more broadly. A fund's incubation period should be defined
as the period until the fund is actively marketed to the public. Returns
achieved before the acquisition of a ticker symbol and the
commencement of advertising efforts should be subject to the same
regulations as returns achieved before the fund was registered with
the SEC.
197. See supraPart II.B.2.
198. Further evidence that incubation doesn't help identify good managers is that fund
families that incubate have higher fund manager turnover than do fund families that do not
incubate. Evans, supra note 53, at 25.
199. Wyatt, supra note 82.
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V. CONCLUSION

Mutual fund companies promote their funds on the basis of
past performance because historical returns are key to investors.
Therefore, the possibility that performance data will be manipulated
is an important regulatory concern. Although the SEC has closely
regulated how funds calculate and present performance data, it has
failed to recognize fully how fund companies deceptively create new
funds with strong performance records.
The incubation of mutual funds-a process in which many new
funds are initially operated outside of public view but only some are
later selected to be marketed to the public-can be manipulative and
misleading if the selection process is not fully disclosed. Like the
enterprising stockbroker who sends out a series of contradictory stock
predictions, mutual fund companies that market only their highperforming incubator funds create the illusion of investment acumen.
Moreover, fund companies further mislead investors by
favoring incubator funds in ways that do not continue after the funds
are marketed to the public. By allocating to them hot IPOs, keeping
them unsustainably small, and restricting shareholder redemptions,
fund companies artificially boost the returns of their incubator funds.
That is, fund companies mislead by failing to disclose that their new
stars will soon be treated like all other funds in the fund company's
constellation.
Studies find that an incubator fund's strong initial performance
generally does not continue after the fund is sold to the public. Why do
high incubation returns not persist? First, the returns-boosting special
treatment that many incubator funds receive does not continue after
the funds are sold to the public. Second, strong incubation returns are
largely a matter of luck, and luck generally does not continue either.
For these reasons, investors who chase high incubation-period returns
will usually be disappointed.
The SEC indirectly regulates incubation by generally
proscribing the reporting or advertising of pre-registration returns.
However, this regulation does not prevent fund companies from
quietly incubating registered funds. Nor has the SEC generally
prevented companies from giving preferential treatment to their
incubator funds.
Just as troublesome is the SEC's willingness to allow fund
companies to market performance data of predecessor investment
accounts, and even of similar funds, without requiring disclosure of
the many accounts and funds whose performance data are not being
used. If fund companies can select which performance data to tout,
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investors will be misled if they do not understand the selection
criteria.
What can be done to protect investors? At the very least, fund
companies should be required to disclose the special treatment they
give to their incubator funds and how they selected which incubator
funds to market to the public. This disclosure will provide the context
in which the funds' returns should be viewed. For example, it must
include the number of other incubator funds that the company
operates and yet chooses not to market to the public. A clearer
disclosure might also explicitly warn investors that high incubationperiod returns are largely a matter of luck, and that fund companies
generally choose to market only their high-performing incubator
funds.
Simple disclosure, however, may not be enough. The special
treatment that incubator funds receive and the way they are selected
for marketing make incubation-period returns inherently misleading.
No amount of disclaimers, explanations, or contextual information can
fully cleanse its misleading character. Given that strong incubation
performance generally does not continue, arguably this performance
should not be permitted to be marketed at all.
Fund incubation, the mutual fund industry's dark and
unsavory secret, merits an examination in the full light of day.

